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Abstract  
It would, for the sake of food security, be rational to start an agricultural transition to a system 
less dependant on fossil fuels in good time before a possible energy crisis. It therefore seems a 
paradox that policy makers choose to do the opposite; establish an additional link between the 
food and energy market through subsidization of food based biofuel production, thus putting 
food security even more at the mercy of energy supply. The dynamic policy model presented 
in this thesis illustrates how growth in food based biofuel production enhances the link 
between the energy and food market. An alternative policy example is developed and tested 
using the model to simulate future scenarios. The model simulations suggest the current 
policy of supporting food based biofuel, combined with a peak in oil production, could lay the 
foundation of a future food crisis and that an alternative policy needs to be implemented as 
quickly as possible; most importantly, before policy makers receive feedback signals in the 
form of a continuous rising food price trend. 
 
Key words: food security, energy security, biofuel, peak oil, system dynamics, policy model, 
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1. Introduction 
 
The eager support, in the United States, the European Union and Brazil, for food based 
biofuel as substitute for petroleum in combustion engines, has provoked a general debate 
about the sustainability of biofuels. An important aspect of this debate is the notion of an 
emerging resource conflict between poor people and car owners; both demanding the 
photosynthetic energy produced on limited agricultural land. The purpose of this thesis is to 
explore possible long-term food security impacts of food based biofuel production in 
combination with peak oil, through the construction and testing of a dynamic policy 
simulation model. The model is in short a highly aggregated representation of the oil, food 
and biofuel market and their main interconnections, constructed using the tools and 
methodology of System Dynamics.  
 Simulation results suggest the current policy of supporting food based biofuel production 
could be laying the foundation of a future food crisis and that an alternative policy needs to be 
implemented as quickly as possible; most importantly, before policy makers receive feedback 
signals in the form of a continuous rising food price trend. 
 The expression “food based biofuel”, as used here, refers to both biofuel produced using 
food crops as feedstock and feedstock grown on land suitable for food production. Virtually 
all biofuel produced today is food based; even Brazilian ethanol from sugarcane. The value of 
sugarcane for human nutrition is limited, but sugar plantation land could be used to produce 
food crops of higher nutritious value. Therefore, according to the definition above, biofuel 
from sugarcane is “food based”.  
 About half of Brazil’s sugarcane yield is currently used to produce Ethanol (World Bank, 
2008). Ethanol production has a long history in Brazil; the domestic market is large, well 
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established and flexible. A growing share of Brazilian sugar mills can produce both sugar and 
ethanol (Schmidhuber, 2006). When oil price is high enough to enable competitive cane based 
ethanol production, these producers will only sell sugar at a price equivalent to the oil price or 
above. As Brazil is the leading sugar exporter, these shifts between sugar and ethanol 
production determine the availability of sugar on the world market and therefore also the 
sugar price. The effect is a sugar price tightly linked to oil price (Schmidhuber, 2006).  
 Whilst sugar is a luxury commodity, other feedstock’s such as maize, potatoes, wheat, 
and cassava are essential to human nutrition. If the growing biofuel market for these 
commodities over time should cause a linkage to oil price similar to the sugar-oil linkage we 
see today, a surge in oil price could risk bringing food price along with it.  
 This would disfavor low income consumers; particularly affecting poor urban 
populations with limited possibility to grow their own food. In low income countries nearly 
half (about 47 per cent) of the household budget is spent on food; first and foremost on low 
value staples, such as cereals. High income consumers use about 13 per cent of their 
household budget on food and a large share of this is spent on meat and dairy products 
(Regmi, 2001). The poorest and least flexible consumers, ironically, experience the per cent 
wise largest price rise because they eat goods with a lower level of processing, meaning that a 
larger share of the consumer’s food price is affected by price changes at the primary 
production level. When food prices rise, high income consumers have more flexibility to 
increase their food budget or substitute some of the high value foods with cheaper staples. 
  The narrowing down of focus, to food based biofuel in place of bioenergy in general, is 
enabled by the premise that as long as it is profitable and legal to produce food based biofuel, 
market forces will ensure that this is done. If it also should become profitable, or even more 
profitable, to produce second generation biofuel using residues from forestry or other 
alternative feedstock’s, the use of these are not in conflict with food based production unless 
the quantity becomes large enough to create a surplus in energy supply.  
Given the premise of a peak in oil production and a continuation of current growth in 
energy demand, the achievement of an energy supply surplus seems unlikely. About one per 
cent of the worlds available arable land was in 2006 used to produce biofuel supplying one 
per cent of global transportation fuel (IEA, 2006). The introduction of second generation 
biofuel, which enables the use of celluloses in stalks, leaves, grasses, and tree trunks, will 
make it possible to also produce biofuel using biomass that is not grown on land suitable for 
food production. This technology is still at the research stage and large scale implementation 
could be several decades of: “The demonstration plants now being built are all well below 
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commercial scale. If they are successful, larger-scale demonstration plants will be needed. 
Investors will need to see these in operation for some time before they invest significant 
capital in such novel technologies” (Childs, 2007). Whilst second generation biofuels enable 
the use of alternative feedstock’s, they also enable a more efficient use of food based 
feedstock. How the established food based biofuel industry should choose to use the 
technology is an open question. A particularly promising technology, still at the research and 
demonstration stage, is algae based biofuel. The company GreenFuel Technologies, has 
successfully converted CO2 emissions from a power plant in Arizona into biofuel using algae 
grown in a bioreactor. CO2 from the smokestack is used to fertilize the algae, which in turn 
are extracted and used as feedstock in conventional biofuel production (Childs, 2007).      
 The remaining thesis text will be structured in the following way: An overview of the 
structure, the main feedback loops and the interconnections between the model sectors will be 
presented in chapter 2. Model overview. In the tree following chapters, the sectors will be 
presented in more detail and connected together step by step. First, in chapter 3. Oil sector, 
the oil sector will be presented alone. All simulation results and sensitivity tests in this chapter 
are without any influence from the biofuel sector or the food sector. In chapter 4. Reference 
mode: the food and oil sector together, the food sector will be presented and connected to the 
oil sector. The oil and food sector together serve the purpose of a reference mode. They 
simulate a world without food based biofuel production. Then, in chapter 5. Biofuel sector: 
Linking together the food and energy market, the biofuel sector (which exclusively produces 
food based biofuel) is connected to the food and oil sector and the models behavior with this 
extra food-energy linkage is compared to the reference mode. Chapter 6. Development and 
testing of an alternative policy, gives an example of how the model can be used to test 
policies and scenarios. Finally, concluding remarks and suggestions for further research are 
presented in Chapter 7. Conclusion.     
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 2. Model overview 
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Figure 1 is a causal loop diagram showing the main structure of the model and the 
connections between its three sectors. The arrows between the variables indicate cause and 
effect, a change in one variable affects the next. The feedback loops, numbered one to eight, 
are circular chains of cause and effect. They will be discussed further in a moment. Notice 
that the oil sector has two connections to the food sector; one directly from oil price to food 
production costs and one indirectly from oil price to food demand going through the biofuel 
sector. There is a fundamental difference between these two connections: The indirect 
connection is weak and hardly noticeable when the biofuel sector is small, but it gains 
momentum when the sector grows. The direct connection starts out relatively strong but 
would, in response to a rising oil price, get weaker over time due to the adoption of less oil 
intensive farming practices. We will now go through the eight loops one by one. 
 Loop one represents the oil depletion process. Oil production causes oil reserves to 
decrease and sooner or later the last barrel of fossil oil will be produced and consumed. This 
historic event will not happen because the oil reserves are completely tapped but because oil 
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 Figure 1: Causal loop diagram of model structure 
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production costs eventually will exceed the value of the oil itself. The models hundred year 
long time horizon, stretching from 1950 to 2050, will not allow this absolute limit to be 
reached but loop one will cause a peak in oil production which starts a chain of counteractions 
rebounding through the other loops: 
 Loop two counteracts the decline in production by raising the oil price. When oil 
production falls short of demand, there will be an upward pressure on oil price. A higher oil 
price stimulates investment and enables the production of less accessible oil reserves. 
 Loop tree counteracts rising oil price by reducing the demand. When price goes up 
demand goes down. This takes time since the short-run oil demand is fairly inelastic. 
 Loop four responds to a rising oil price by increasing biofuel production. The biofuel 
sector only includes biofuel produced using food crops or crops grown on land suitable for 
food crop production. We assume perfect substitution between oil and biofuel so that the price 
of one energy unit of biofuel is equal to the price of an equivalent energy unit of oil based 
fuel. If enough biofuel is produced to compensate for a declining oil production, the oil price 
incentive to further growth in biofuel production is removed. It is probably possible, 
technically, to substitute an oil demand of over 11 000 Mtoe with food based biofuel in 2050 
using second generation biofuel technology (IEA, 2006), but the food consumption of nine 
billion people will most likely make loop five more dominating. 
 Loop five counteracts biofuel production by raising food prices. When the biofuel sector 
expands it demands more of the primary food production and food prices are pushed upwards. 
The general price level of food affects biofuel profitability because the cost of purchasing 
food used to produce biofuel accounts for around 50% of total production costs (IEA, 2006).  
 Loop six counteracts rising food price by reducing the demand for primary food 
production. This change in food demand is primarily caused by poor people moving 
downward in the food chain, eating less milk and meat products.     
 Loop seven responds to rising food prices by increasing food production. Although this 
market mechanism may seem fairly straight forward it is worth mentioning that a 
counteraction of rising prices also could be driven by other factors; for example public policy 
aiming to prevent social unrest and food riots. 
 Loop eight sets the boundary for loop seven. Potential food production is the primary 
food production assumed possible using existing agricultural land and technology. When food 
production increases, the remaining potential decreases and it becomes harder and more 
resource consuming to increase production further.  
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3. Oil sector 
 
The purpose of the oil sector is to simulate an emerging shortage in transportable energy 
caused by the depletion of oil reserves; including crude oil, gas condensate and natural gas 
liquids (NGL’s). The shortage caused by a peak in production effects the other model sectors 
through a surge in end use oil price. As oil price rises a smooth and quick technological 
transition to other sources of transportable energy is assumed, in effect setting a crude oil 
price roof at approximately 200 real 2006 USD per barrel in the base case simulation.  
 After the behavior and sensitivity of the oil sector base simulation has been presented, we 
will look more closely at the model structure of the sector.      
 
3.1 Behavior of the oil sector 
In the oil sector base simulation and sensitivity tests there is no feedback from the biofuel or 
food sector. The parameter values used are the same as the ones we will use in the reference 
mode and the base case simulation in chapter four and five. Figure 2 shows the oil production 
and oil price of the oil sector base simulation compared to historic data and the distribution of 
sensitivity test runs using parameters and ranges as displayed in table 1. The sensitivity test 
was done using Latin Hypercube Sampling as recommended in the literature (Ford, 1999). 
Alternative scenarios will be presented for the size of reserves and the speed of technological 
progress, these assumptions are therefore not part of the base case sensitivity test. The pattern 
of behavior is the same in all of the oil sector sensitivity simulations: An s-shaped transition 
from abundant cheap oil to a higher price level and a temporary peak in production during the 
transition from conventional reserves to alternatives such as tar sands, coal to liquid and 
renewable energy sources other than food based biofuel. The assumption of a smooth 
technological transition avoids an oil price overshoot (see 3.2.) The overshoot in the 1970’s 
was caused by a relatively small shortage. A global peak in oil production could possibly 
cause an even larger overshoot. The model is not built to capture short term price 
developments or oscillations and its lack of feedback from oil price to economic growth 
makes it unsuitable for simulations with extreme oil prices.           
 
Parameter Min value Base value Max value Unit 
long term price elasticity of oil demand -0.2 -0.6 -1 dimensionless 
short term price elasticity of oil demand -0.01 -0.08 -0.5 dimensionless 
oil price sensitivity 2 8 20 dimensionless 
long term price effects delay 5 15 30 year 
short term price effects delay 0.25 0.75 3 year 
 Table 1:  The parameters and ranges used in the sensitivity test  
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3.2 Oil reserves and marginal cost 
The oil sector (figure 3) is sensitive to assumptions about the size of reserves and the speed of 
technological progress. The initial reserve size used was found by combining data from 
British Petroleum’s statistical review (BP, 2007) and an oil production time series from World 
Policy Institute1. BP define oil reserves as “generally taken to be those quantities that 
geological and engineering information indicates with reasonable certainty can 
                                                 
1
 Source: compiled by Earth Policy Institute http://www.earth-policy.org/Books/PB3/data.htm (10.05.08) 
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 Figure 2: Oil sector base simulation and its sensitivity to the parameters in table 1.   
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   Mtoe   Data source 
 Oil produced 1950-2006  145519   WRI, 2007 
+ Proved reserves 2006 164798  BP, 2007 
= Oil reserves 1950 310317   
- Oil in production 1950 13000  model approximation 
≈ Initial oil reserves 300000     
   
 Table 2: Calculation of oil reserves used in oil sector base case and reference mode  
 
be recovered in the future from known reservoirs under existing economic and operating 
conditions”(BP, 2007). These reserves include gas condensate and natural gas liquids 
(NLG’s) but not Canadian tar sands beyond those already under active development. BP 
reports an estimate of 23 700 Mtoe for total Canadian tar sand reserves, of which roughly 6% 
are considered to be under active development. As the conventional reserves are depleted, a 
transition is assumed to tar sands and other alternatives like coal to liquid or transportable 
renewable energy (apart from food based biofuel, which will be covered by the biofuel 
sector). These alternatives are, as a simplification, produced by the oil sector once the 
conventional reserves are empty, causing the stock of reserves to go negative. A scenario with 
larger conventional reserves will be tested later.   
oil profit
Oil reserves Oil inproduction
new oil
fields
oil production
crude oil
price
initial oil
reserves
marginal
oil cost
oil extraction
cost table
<oil capacity
lifetime> oil construction
start
Oil capacity
 
  
  
 
 
 
 Oil reserves ))(t reserves Oil fields, oil newINTEGAL( 0−=  
  
 Oil reserves (t0) = initial oil reserves 
 
 Oil in production = INTEGRAL(new oil fields – oil production, Oil in production (t0))  
Figure 4: Oil reserves and marginal cost structure 
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 Oil in production (t0) = (Oil capacity+Oil construction)*oil capacity lifetime 
 
 new oil fields = oil construction start * oil capacity lifetime 
 
 oil production = Oil capacity 
 
It is for simplicity assumed that oil production always equals oil capacity. This has some 
effect on the models ability to explain cyclical behavior. The model divides reserves into oil 
reserves and oil in production (figure 4)2. As soon as a new oil project is started the total oil 
reserve of that field moves over to the stock of oil in production. The size of new oil fields 
brought into production is found by multiplying oil construction start (the amount of annual 
production capacity entering construction this year) by the total lifetime of capacity. Oil in 
production is therefore initialized using both oil capacity and oil capacity under construction. 
 
 oil profit = ( )
price oil crude
cost oil marginalprice oil crude −
 
 
Oil profit is not an absolute number, it is a relative, dimensionless number representing the 
balance between crude oil price and marginal oil cost. These two are in balance when oil  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
profit is zero. Marginal oil cost is the average cost of producing one barrel of oil (including a 
normal surplus). When oil profit is greater than zero, the industry is more profitable than 
normal, when it is below zero the average producer has a deficit or a smaller surplus than 
desired.  
  
                                                 
2
 Structure adopted from unpublished material by Erling Moxnes 
Base case table 
OR MOC IOR 
0.00 200 
0.05 185 
0.10 150 
0.15 80 
0.20 50 
0.25 33 
0.30 27 
0.35 23 
0.40 20 
0.45 17 
0.50 15 
0.55 14.2 
0.60 14 
1.00 14 
 Figure 5: Oil production cost table, base case and  alternative 
 scenarios with faster and slower technological development 
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 marginal oil cost = ƒ 





reserves oil initial
reserves Oil
 
  
Marginal oil cost is defined as a function of oil reserves over initial oil reserves. Figure 5 
displays the oil production costs table used in the base simulation of the oil sector and two 
alternative scenarios used to test the model. The main assumption of the curve is a rising 
marginal cost, since the most convenient and accessible oil fields have a tendency to be 
developed first and exploration is more successful when there is still a lot of oil left to find.  
 Developments in extraction technology are assumed to offset the rise in costs for some 
time but eventually production costs start rising exponentially. The effect saturates as costs 
start to reach the cost of alternative sources. The base case cost table assumes an oil price of 
200 USD would be sufficient to enable a smooth technological transition to other sources. 
The lower curve represents a scenario 
with faster technological 
development where 100 USD per 
barrel is sufficient, and the higher one 
represents a slower technological 
development scenario where a price 
of 300 USD per barrel is needed. The 
technological scenarios are in figure 6 
combined with a scenario with 50 per 
cent higher oil reserves. The main 
effect of larger oil reserves is that the 
peak in oil production, and rise in 
price, is postponed another 15 years. 
The simulated oil prices follow the 
pattern of their respective production 
cost curves. These scenarios; Larger 
oil reserves, slower and faster 
technologic development, will in 
chapter six be used to test the 
robustness of an alternative policy.  
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 Figure 6: Base case oil price and production compared  with 
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3.3 Oil production capacity 
The structure chosen to represent oil production capacity (Figure 7) is taken from the generic 
commodity market model in Business Dynamics (Sterman, 2000). It is based on an anchor 
and adjustment heuristic where the anchor is current capacity and the adjustment from the 
anchor point depends on the expected profitability of future investments and the time decision 
makers need to make plans and reach a final investment decision. 
 
 
Oil capacity
discarded oil
capacity
oil
capacity
lifetime
oil construction time
desired new oil
capacity
oil capacity
adjustment time
table for desired
oil capacity
Oil construction
new oil
capacity
oil
construction
start
effect of oil profit
on desired capacity
oil construction
adjustment
oil construction
adjustment timeExpected oil
profit
change in
expected oil
profit
expected oil profit
adjustment time
oil profit
  
 
 
 
 
 
capacity oil
discarded
 timeadjustmentcapacity  oil
capacity) Oil-capacity) desiredon profit  oil ofeffect *capacity ((Oil
capacity oil
new desired +





=   
 
The equation for desired new oil capacity first calculates the desired oil capacity by 
multiplying current oil capacity with the effect of oil profit on desired capacity. Then current 
capacity is subtracted from desired and divided by the adjustment time to find desired 
capacity adjustment. Finally, the expected loss of capacity, the discarded oil capacity, is 
added.  
  
 effect of oil profit on desired oil capacity = ƒ(Expected oil profit) 
 
 Expected oil profit = INTEGRAL(change in expected oil profit, Expected oil profit (t0)) 
 
 Expected oil profit (t0) = oil profit (t0) 
 
 change in expected oil profit = ( )
  timeadjustment price oil expected
profit oil Expectedprofit oil −
 
Figure 7: Oil capacity structure 
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The effect of oil profit on desired oil capacity is a nonlinear function of the expected oil 
profit. Figure 8 shows the function used. Expected oil profit is zero when the average 
marginal cost of production = the price of crude oil. At this point there is no desire to adjust 
capacity; or, in other words, the sum of desired upward and downward adjustment breaks 
even. The larger the expected profit is, the larger the effect is on desired capacity. The effect 
saturates because there are limits to the financing and absorption of new capital. Likewise, 
when the average expected oil profit moves below zero the producers with the highest  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
production costs, or the most pessimistic future expectations, start investing less than what is 
needed to replace discarded capacity. 
      
 oil construction adjustment = 
 timeadjustmenton constructi oil
on)constructi Oil-on time)cunstructi oil*capacity oil new ((desired
 
 
When desired new oil capacity is found an adjustment needs to be made for the capital 
already under construction. The expression above the fraction line determines if there is a gap 
between current construction and the construction needed to complete new oil capacity at the 
rate desired. The oil construction adjustment time is the time needed to close the gap. This can 
be seen as a reflection of the quality and availability of information about the actual gap and 
the attention decision makers pay to this information. 
 The use of this structure does, however, imply a risk of getting models that over-estimate 
the rationality of decision makers. The short oil construction adjustment time used in this 
model (see Appendix) is probably a deliberate example of such overestimation. The motive 
was to guide attention away from oscillations and focus on the long term effect of the 
EOP EOPDC 
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Figure 8: Table for desired oil capacity 
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depletion process. The model was not constructed with the purpose of simulating oscillations 
in oil price. To do that properly capacity utilization and probably also some representation of 
OPEC policy and other important stakeholders would need to be incorporated.  
 
 Oil capacity = INTEGRAL(new oil capacity – discarded oil capacity, Oil capacity (t0)) 
 
 discarded oil capacity = 
lifetimecapacity  oil
capacity Oil
 
  
 new oil capacity = 
on timeconstructi oil
onconstructi oil
 
 
The choice of using a first order delay for capacity construction was also partly motivated by 
a wish to suppress oscillations. The variable oil construction time is an aggregate of the time 
it takes to search for oil and construct the necessary capital to extract and refine it. The delay 
is first order because the formulation of new oil capacity as a stock divided by an adjustment 
time, assumes perfect mixing. This means that all construction projects, regardless of being 
old or new, are weighted equally. A boost in construction start one year would make the 
completion rate of new oil capacity increase during the same year. This behavior might seem 
unrealistic and could be prevented using a delay of higher order; distinguishing old from new 
construction. The smoothness’ of the first order delay can, however, be interpreted as a 
representation of short term adjustments in capacity utilization that otherwise might need 
explicit modeling to avoid large oscillations.  
 
 Oil construction = INTEGRAL(oil construction start – new oil capacity, Oil construction (t0)) 
 
 Oil construction (t0) = discarded oil capacity*oil construction time 
 
 oil construction start = MAX(0, desired new oil capacity + oil construction adjustment) 
   
Oil construction start equals desired new oil capacity adjusted for the capacity already under 
construction. If current construction activity is large and the desired new capacity very small 
the sum of the two could be a value below zero. To avoid negative numbers the oil 
construction start rate is formulated to take the maximum value of zero and the sum of the 
two input variables. Oil construction is initialized at the level needed to replace discarded 
capacity 
 
3.4 Oil price 
 end use oil price = crude oil price + oil refining and distribution 
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The end use oil price (figure 9) is the price paid by consumers. The constant oil refining and 
distribution cost used in the model corresponds roughly to the average refining and 
distribution cost assumed in the annual international fuel prices survey conducted by the 
Deutche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ, 2007). Gasoline taxation is 
omitted due to a large uncertainty regarding the response of decision makers to future changes 
in oil price.   
 
 
  
 crude oil price = Expected oil price * (oil market balanceoil price sensitivity) 
 
 oil market balance = ( )production biofuelproduction oil
demand oil
+
 
 
Crude oil price is modeled as the oil price expected by traders multiplied by the effect of 
current balance between supply and demand. All inventories have been excluded with the aim 
of keeping the model as small and simple as possible. This causes a small discrepancy 
between oil produced and consumed, but by far not enough to effect model behavior.  
 Biofuel is treated as a perfect oil substitute and has a direct effect on the oil market 
balance. This is a slight simplification of reality since the logistics are a little bit different and 
there are currently limits to the fraction of ethanol that can be blended in gasoline used in 
conventional cars (Childs, 2007). The strength of modeling oil market balance this way is that 
it captures the maximum possible feedback from biofuel production to oil price. Pro biofuel 
rhetoric focusing on potential CO2 reductions and gained energy security both tend to be 
based on the assumption that biofuel substitutes oil. To the extent biofuel actually does this it 
could be relevant to ask how much of the oil demand it could cover, and if it covers enough to 
Figure 9: Oil price structure 
oil market
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effect oil price; how large would the effect of cheaper oil be on oil demand? How much 
would it eat up of the assumed substitution benefit?  
 
 Expected oil price = INTEGRAL(change in expected oil price, Expected oil price (t0)) 
 
 change in expected oil price = ( )
price oil expectedadjust   totime
price oil Expectedprice oil expected dicatedin −
 
 
 indicated expected oil price = ( )
2
price oil crude  costs oil inalargm +
 
 
Traders adjust their price expectations to fit the reality they perceive. Current price is seen as 
a good indicator of what the trading price should be. The indicated expected oil price is 
assumed to be the average between current price and the marginal oil costs. 
 oil price relative to initial = 
price oil use end initial
price oil use end
 
  
 initial end use oil price = end use oil price (t0)  
 
 oil price relative to traditional = 
price oil lTraditiona
price oil use end
 
 
 Traditional oil price = INTEGRAL(change in traditional oil price, traditional oil price (t0)) 
 
 change in traditional oil price = ( )
 timeadjustment price oil ltraditiona
price oil ltraditionaprice oil use end −
 
 
Price is a relative expression. The oil price in the 1990’s was high compared to the price level 
of the 1960’s, but low compared to 1975 – 1985 prices. The model uses two different relative 
oil prices: The first one, oil price relative to initial, is the absolute change in oil price relative 
to 1950. The reference point, oil price in 1950, is constant. The second, oil price relative to 
traditional, refers to a dynamic reference; the traditional oil price. This is the long term 
average price level that society has adapted to through its development of habits and through 
technology choices. Short term consumer responses to price are based on the traditional price 
whilst the long term adaptation of society is based on the price relative to initial.   
 
 
3.5. Oil demand 
 demand oilon 
effects  termShort
  *  demand oilon 
effects  termLong
 *  demand
oil indicateddemand oil =  
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Oil demand (figure 10) is modeled using an exogenous underlying demand (the indicated oil 
demand) multiplied by short and long term effects of oil price. A reasonable historical fit was 
found when the indicated oil demand was based on growth in GDP per person and an income 
elasticity of 0.9 (see figure 2). Future projection of indicated oil demand is based on a 
constant annual GDP growth rate of 2 per cent and UN’s medium population projection3.  
 
 





= )t(demand oilon 
effects price  termLongt
,
effects price
 termlongin  changeINTEGRALdemand oilon 
effects price  termLongt
0  
 
 
delay effects price  termlong
demand oilon 
effects price  termgLon
demand oilon  effects
price  termlongindicated
effects price
 termlongin  change 




−
=  
 
 indicated long term price effects on oil demand 
  =  initial  torelative price oil demand oil of elasticity price  termlong  
 
                                                 
3
 Source: World Resource Institute from: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
of the United Nations Secretariat. 2007. World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision. Dataset on CD-ROM. 
New York: United Nations. 
Figure 10: Oil demand structure 
 23 
Long term effects of oil price on demand could for example be a technologic transition to 
more fuel efficient cars, improvement of the public transport systems or a change in peoples 
attitudes and thinking about oil consumption.   
 
 





= )t(demand oilon 
effects price  termShort
,
effects price
short termin  changeINTEGRALdemand oilon 
effects price  termShort
0  
 
 
delay effects price  termshort
demand oilon 
effects price Short term
demand oilon  effects
price short termindicated
effects price
short termin  change 




−
=  
 
 indicated short term price effects on oil demand 
  =  al tradition torelative price oil demand oil of elasticity price short term  
 
 
Short term effects could for example be people choosing to drive less to save money to pay 
their bills. Figure 11 shows the long and short-term effects of oil price on oil demand in the 
base case simulation of the oil sector. 
The long-term effects are by far the 
most significant since short-term 
consumer response to oil price is 
assumed to be quite inelastic. 
The following numerical example 
could serve as an illustration of why 
the short-term effect is so little: In 
November 2006 the average world 
market price of crude oil was slightly 
above 60 USD per barrel and the 
average price of gasoline at 
Norwegian gas stations was 180 US 
cents per liter. Crude oil accounted 
for 38 cents, refining and distribution 
costs approximately 15 cents, and 
taxation 127 cents (GTZ, 2007). Let 
us assume oil price suddenly rose 
from 60 to 240 USD per barrel. 
Keeping the taxation level, refining 
  Figure 11: Long- and short-term effect of oil  
  price on oil demand in the oil sector base case 
  simulation 
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and distribution costs constant the approximate effect on Norwegian gasoline price would be:  
 increase 63%  
litreper  cents 180
 litreper  cents 294
 
127  15  38
127  15  4)*(38
==
++
++
 
 
An imagined four fold increase in oil price, from 60 to 240 USD per barrel in the year 2006, 
would, according to the rough estimate above, not cause more than a 63 per cent increase in 
Norwegian gasoline price. Gasoline and motor oil accounted for 3.4 per cent of the annual 
expenditures of Norwegian households in the period 2004-20064. A 63 per cent increase in 
gasoline price would be the equivalent of 2.1 per cent rise in annual household expenditures, 
all else being equal.  
 Norway is, with its population of 4.7 million, high wages and gasoline taxation, not a 
representative country. Let us do the same estimate for a major gasoline consumer, the United 
States: The result is 180 per cent rise in gasoline price due to the low gasoline taxation level 
(10 cents). Despite cheaper gasoline American households spent a larger share (4.3 per cent) 
of their annual expenditures on gasoline and motor oil in 20055. A 180 per cent rise in 
gasoline price would, in the United States, be equivalent to 7.7 per cent rise in annual 
household expenditures.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4Source: Statistics Norway (SSB): http://www.ssb.no/emner/05/02/fbu/tab-2007-09-10-01.html (09.06.08) 
 
5Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics: http://www.bls.gov/cex/csxann05.pdf (09.06.08) 
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 Figure 12: Behavior of food sector, reference mode and a 
 run without the effect of oil price on food price. Historical 
 data sources: Food price from IMF and food production 
 from FAO.    
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4. Reference mode: The food and oil sector together 
 
 
The purpose of the reference mode 
simulation is to show how the model 
behaves when no food or food land is 
used to produce biofuel. Food price 
rises after year 2000 independently of 
effects from biofuel production or oil 
price in the reference mode simulation.  
 The behavior of the food sector 
will first be presented, after that we 
will take a closer look at the model 
structure. Two alternative potential 
food production scenarios will be 
presented. 
  
4.1. Behavior of the food sector 
Figure 12 shows the reference mode 
behavior, where the food and oil sector 
is connected, compared to historic data 
and a model run where the oil sector is 
disconnected so that the increasing oil 
price has no effect on food production 
costs. Oil price hardly has any visible 
effect on food production, but a slight 
effect can be seen in food price and in 
the fraction of potential food 
production capacity used. Notice that 
the food price rises in both cases, even 
when the effect of a rising oil price is 
removed.  
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4.2. Food production    
The model is sensitive to assumptions about the development of potential food production. 
Figure 14 shows reference food production and price compared with a scenario where 
technology is able to keep on expanding the production potential and a scenario where 
environmental problems erode it. Potential food production is an exogenous time series 
representing the primary food 
production assumed possible using 
the agricultural land and technology 
available at a given point in time. 
Data from the Food and Agricultural 
Organization indicate that we were 
utilizing roughly 50 per cent of the 
potential in the year 2000 (FAO, 
2003). If we accept this as a 
reference point, how large was the 
potential before that, and how is it 
likely to develop? 
 An informed guess regarding 
the food production potential before 
2000 is that it has been growing 
faster than demand and production. 
The high yielding varieties of wheat 
and rice introduced during the green 
revolution have together with other 
agro-scientific discoveries expanded 
the production possibilities, whilst a 
continuous expansion of agricultural 
land has compensated for the land 
lost to urbanization, salinization, 
erosion and exhaustion.  
 After 2000 the growth in food 
production potential is assumed to 
saturate in the reference mode. 
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Figure 14: Effect of production potential. Reference mode 
compared with an optimistic technology scenario and a 
scenario with environmental problems.  
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 Figure 15: Food production structure 
Land is a limited resource, and the most fertile land is already in use. It will be more and more 
difficult to keep expanding at a rate high enough to replace losses. The size of yields 
attainable is constrained by biological limits – for example in plant physiology (FAO, 2003). 
Whether current science is close to these limits or not makes little difference to the base 
assumption of saturation: As yields increase the potential for further increase shrinks and 
increasing yields further becomes a little bit more difficult.  
 In the yield technology optimism scenario it is assumed that attainable yields continue 
rising and a widespread adoption of sustainable land use practices minimizes the loss of land. 
Food price remains low in this scenario, apart from a slight rise during the transition from oil 
to other sources. Production continues its growth 
without saturation. 
 The environmental problems scenario takes 
account of uncertainty about the future state of 
the planet. It assumes climate change and the sum 
of human activity over time erodes more food 
production potential than what is gained through 
technologic progress and land expansion. Food 
production saturates, prices rise exponentially.  
 These three scenarios imply a dramatic span 
in food price and they will, together with the 
scenarios of larger oil reserves and faster or 
slower development presented in the previous 
chapter, be used to test the robustness of an 
alternative policy in chapter 6.4. Now we will 
take a closer look at the model formulation of 
food production: 
 food production = potential food production * Food production as fraction of potential 
 
 Food production as fraction of potential  
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 indicated change in food production fraction 
  = desired food production as fraction of potential - food production as fraction of potential  
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The stock food production as fraction of potential (figure 15), represents current primary food 
production relative to potential food production. One could think of it as a parallel to capacity 
utilization; the potential food production time series is the capacity and food production as 
fraction of potential is the utilization.  
 Desired food production as fraction of potential is anchored to current and adjusted up or 
down from this point depending on the profitability of production. The function used is 
identical to the table for desired oil capacity (see figure 8).  
 The adjustment needed to close the gap between desired and actual state is the indicated 
change in food production fraction, and the time it takes food producers to close it depends on 
current utilization and the direction of change. An example of why the direction of change 
matters could be a situation where food production is very high: The potential for further 
production increase is limited, but the reduction potential is as large as the production itself. 
Downward adjustment should in this case be easier and faster than upward adjustment. The 
combination of a MAX and a MIN function enables differentiation between adjustment 
directions and prevents the production fraction from going below zero or over one. 
 
4.3. Food production costs    
Food production costs (figure 16) are effected by the fraction of potential production utilized 
(intensity), and oil price. A food price index, with 1961 as base year, is used to represent both 
food production costs and food price. 
 
 
( )
price food Expected
costs food Expected-price food Expectedlityprofitabil food expected =  
 
 Expected food production costs  
  = INTEGRAL(change in expected food production costs, Expected food production costs(t0)) 
  
 Expected food production costs(t0) = initial food production costs      
 
 
( )
 timeadjustment costs food expected
costs production food expected - costs production food
  
costs food
 expectedin  change
=   
  
 
costs foodon 
price oil of effect
*potential offraction 
as production Food
  ƒ*
costs production
food initial
  costs production food 





=   
 30 
   
The food production costs table (figure 17) 
rises exponentially. At the bottom of the 
curve there is no production at all and it 
takes little effort to increase it; one could 
just throw out seeds at random and wait 
for the result. Returns diminish as 
production gets closer to potential 
production; more capital, inputs, human 
labor and knowledge is needed to increase 
it further. At the very top of the curve one 
could imagine a team of agricultural 
specialists carefully monitoring each field. 
 The output of the food production 
cost curve is multiplied by initial food 
production costs and an effect of oil price 
on food costs. 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.4. Sensitivity of food production costs to oil price 
The sensitivity of food production costs to oil price depends on the energy intensity (the 
amount of energy used per unit produced), the type of energy used and the energy fraction of 
total production costs. These factors are dynamic; they change over time because agricultural 
practice gradually adapts to its surroundings. To capture this adaptation process, sensitivity to 
oil price is modeled as a stock (figure 18). 
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 Figure 16: Food production costs structure 
foodproduction
costs
initial food
production costs food production
costs table
effect of oil
price on food
costs
expected food
profitability
Expected food
production
costs
change in
expected
food costs
expected
food costs
adjustment
time
Expected
food price
Food production as
fraction of potential
 Figure 17: Food production costs table 
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Figure 18: Sensitivity to oil price structure 
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 effect of oil price on food costs = oil price relative to initialSensitivity to oil price 
 Sensitivity to oil price = INTEGRAL(change in sensitivity to oil price, Sensitivity to oil price(t0)) 
 
 change in sensitivity to oil price 
 timeadjustmenty sensitivit price oil
 price) oil y toSensetivit - initial)  torelative price (ƒ(oil
=  
 
Recall the gap in figure 12 between 
reference food price and food price 
without the effect of oil price. This gap 
shows what the effect of the sensitivity to 
oil price structure is. The behavior 
causing this gap can be seen in figure 19. 
The line labeled indicated sensitivity to oil 
price is the output of the table for 
sensitivity to oil price (figure 20). 
Sensitivity adjusts gradually towards 
indicated. The initial gap between them is 
large because agriculture was more 
traditional in 1950 and cheap fossil fuel 
represented an enormous potential energy 
input. Research and farming practice has 
over time learnt to utilize this energy 
potential.  
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4.5. Food price 
 
 food price = priceon  balance
food of effect
*priceon  costs
food of effect
*price food
Expected
 
 Expected food price 
  = INTEGRAL(change in expected food price, Expected food price (t0))  
 
 Expected food price (t0) = initial food price 
 
 change in expected food price = 
 timeadjustment price food expected
price) food Expected - price (food
 
  
 effect of food balance on price = food market balancesensitivity of food price to food balance 
  
 food market balance = 
production food
demand food total
 
  
 





−+= 1
price food Expected
costs production food Expected
*
costs food  toprice
food of ysensitivit1priceon  costs
food of effect
 
 
Food price is, like oil price, modeled using a stock representing traders expected equilibrium 
price (figure 21). Price is anchored to expected price and adjusted according to inventory 
levels, here represented by market balance6, and changes in production costs. The formulation 
used for effect of food costs on price makes it possible to adjust assumptions about the quality 
of information traders have about production costs and the extent of attention paid to this 
information. If sensitivity of food price to food costs = 0, traders completely ignore 
                                                 
6
 See discussion in 3.4. Oil price  
OPRI SOP 
0 0.165 
1 0.16 
2 0.15 
3 0.13 
4 0.1 
5 0.07 
6 0.05 
7 0.04 
8 0.035 
9 0.03 
10 0.03 
Figure 20: Table for sensitivity to oil price  
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information about costs. If it = 1, traders ignore 
the expected equilibrium price and base their 
price setting on expected costs (Sterman, 
2000).  
 The sensitivities used in the model, both 
regarding food price and food demand, were 
found through model calibration to historical 
production and price data. More time could be 
spent in the future to recover good estimates of 
these variables if this could strengthen the 
model. Even if precise estimates were found, 
we have no guarantee that observations of the 
past can explain behavior more than 40 years 
ahead.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.6. Food demand 
 
 total food demand = Human food demand + food for fuel 
 
 Human food demand = INTEGRAL(change in food demand, Human food demand (t0)) 
 
 demand foodhuman in  change  
  
( )
 timeadjustment demand food 
demand foodHuman demand foodhuman  indicated −
=  
 
 indicated human food demand  
  = demand foodon 
price food of effect
*demand foodon  change
income of effect
*population
lativeRe
*demand food
human initial
 
 
 effect of income change on food demand  = relative GDP per capitaincome elasticity of food demand 
 
 effect of food price on food demand = relative food priceprice elasticity of food demand 
 
 
 relative food price = 
price food initial
price food
  
 
Population growth is the main driving factor of food demand (figure 22). Changes in food 
price and income effect the food chain level of eating. A diet higher up in the food chain 
 Figure 21: Food price structure 
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includes a larger fraction of meat and dairy products and requires more primary production  
due to the energy loss from fodder to animal product. The population and GDP per capita 
time series used to model food demand are identical to those used for oil demand. 
 Food for fuel is the food used as feedstock for biofuel production. This is added to 
human food demand to find total food demand. As already mentioned, the reference mode 
simulation’s and all other simulation results presented so far, omit food for fuel. This will be 
added in the next section when the biofuel sector is connected to the food and oil sector.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 22: Food demand structure 
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5. Biofuel sector: Linking together the food and energy market. 
 
In this chapter the food and oil sector  is connected to the biofuel sector, the base case 
behavior of the complete model is analyzed and the structure of the biofuel sector presented. 
The biofuel sector simulates the production of biofuel using food crops or crops grown on 
land suitable for food crop production. The production of transportable energy using other 
sources of biomass happens in the oil sector as part of the transition to alternatives as 
conventional oil is depleted. The model behavior of the base case simulation will first be 
presented. After that we will look more closely at the structure of the biofuel sector.  
 
5.1. Base case model behavior 
The base case simulation, where all three model sectors are connected together, is not meant 
to represent the most likely future scenario, it is simply a scenario where the current policy of 
supporting biofuel production is kept and where all parameter values in the oil and food sector 
are equal to their reference mode values. The output of the base case simulation is, when 
compared to the reference mode, the effect of adding an extra link between the food and oil 
sector (figure 23). Notice how small the effect is at first and how quickly it grows.  
 The two graphs on the left hand side represent gains of food based biofuel production 
whilst costs (apart from the cost of the support measures themselves) are represented by the 
two graphs on the right.  
 Assuming perfect substitutability between oil and biofuel, a total of nearly 46 000 million 
tonnes oil is substituted with biofuel and the surge in oil price is counteracted temporarily, 
gaining another thirty years before it approaches a 200 USD per barrel level. This could, for 
many nations, be a valuable contribution to energy security, both in terms of saved oil import 
expenses and the extra time gained to adopt to a higher oil price. The oil substitution would 
most likely also represent a net CO2 reduction but the size of this depends on the average CO2 
budget of the biofuel produced, which again depends on technologic development and policy 
choices. The World Resource Institute has compiled estimates of the life cycle reductions in 
greenhouse gas emissions of different feedstock’s when biofuel is used in place of fossil fuel 
(Childs, 2007). The ranges between high and low estimates and between different feedstock’s 
are large. Corn is, for example, only estimated to give a reduction of 15 to 40 per cent per unit 
fossil fuel displaced while estimates for sugar cane range between 60 and 90 per cent. Indirect 
effects, that a life cycle analysis is unable to capture, could make the reduction even smaller: 
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 Figure 23: Base case model behavior  
“If sugarcane is planted on land that was previously being used for other productive purposes, 
such as growing other crops or grazing livestock, these activities may be displaced. This land-
use pressure could ultimately lead to deforestation elsewhere, and therefore carbon emissions 
indirectly attributable to ethanol production” (Childs, 2007). The net CO2 equivalent 
greenhouse gas reduction gained by the oil substitution in the base case simulation, is highly 
uncertain and could in the worst case, using feedstock’s that only yield small reductions and 
also displace rainforests, even be negative.  
 Base case food price is, in 2050, more than four times as high as the reference mode. The 
total shaded area in the top right graph represents the amount of food used as feedstock for 
biofuel production; accounting for about 50 per cent of total food production in 2050. A two 
way pressure is created by this feedstock demand; an upward pressure on agricultural land 
and forests due to increased intensification and land expansion and a downward pressure on, 
primarily poor food consumers that are overbid by richer car owners to exemplify. 
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Figure 24 shows the structure of the biofuel 
sector. Half of it has close resemblance 
with the oil sector and will therefore only 
be briefly commented. The remaining 
structure is quite easily understandable in 
figure 24. The reader is inquired to refer 
back to this figure as we proceed with the 
presentation. 
 
5.2. Profitability of biofuel production 
 
  
biofuel profit =  
 
( )
price biofuel
supportcosts biofuelprice biofuel +−
  
 
The profitability of biofuel production is, 
like in the oil sector, expressed by a 
dimensionless number representing the 
balance between price and costs, but a 
variable representing public support is also 
included in the equation. We will look at 
the tree variables defining biofuel profit 
one by one, starting with support: 
  
 support = 0 + STEP(170, 1975) 
 
The support variable is an aggregate of all 
public support measures. It is modeled 
using a STEP function which is zero in the 
beginning and steps up to a constant 
support level of 170 million USD per Mtoe 
in 1975 (the start of the Brazilian ethanol program). This support level corresponds to about 
0.15 USD per litre gasoline; or 30 to 40 per cent of what the World Bank considers to be the 
cost of current support measures in the United States (World Bank, 2008). As can be seen in 
figure 25 the support level chosen is just enough to make sugar cane based ethanol production 
  Figure 25: Base case biofuel profit and production  
  and a test simulation without support. 
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profitable in 1975 and to support a growth in biofuel production that fits with historic data7. In 
a test simulation excluding support, production is not profitable before 2005; the year 
simulated crude oil price rises above 40 USD per barrel. Table 3 shows, for different 
feedstock’s and without support, the approximate range of crude oil price within biofuel could 
be produced with profit in the year 2005 (IEA, 2006). This relatively large range in 
production costs could, in addition to mere qualities of the feedstock’s themselves, be 
attributed to socio-economic and geographical differences between the three major biofuel 
producers (Brazil, the United States and the European Union).  
 
 
                 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 biofuel price = end use oil price * conversion to million USD per Mtoe  
 
Since perfect substitution is assumed between oil and biofuel (see chapter 3.4.), biofuel price 
is equal to end use oil price. It is converted from USD per barrel to million USD per million 
tonn oil equivalent to be consistent with the unit used for biofuel production.    
 
 biofuel costs = feedstock costs + other biofuel production costs 
 
The purchase of feedstock typically amounts to more than 50 per cent of total biofuel 
production costs (IEA, 2006). Other biofuel production costs are an aggregate of all other 
costs including; capital, labor, maintenance, energy and chemicals. Treating this variable as a 
constant can be justified for a rough model like this because the energy fraction of costs does 
not depend heavily on transportable energy and is so small that it would largely have been 
overshadowed by the effect of oil on biofuel price. Further more, the scope of significant 
reductions in running costs and capital costs is small for conventional biofuel production 
since the technology used is mature. Feed stock costs, on the other hand, depend on food price 
and they could be reduced significantly through technologic development. 
 
 feedstock costs = feedstock price * food needed per Mtoe * effect of fraction of food 
 
                                                 
7
 Source: compiled by Earth Policy Institute http://www.earth-policy.org/Books/PB3/data.htm (10.05.08) 
 
Profitable at oil price  Feedstock 
 USD per barrel 
Major producer 
Sugar Cane 40 to 80 Brazil 
Maize and sugar beet 95 to 125 United States 
Wheat and oil seeds 110 to 160 European Union 
Table 3: Production cost ranges of biofuel in 2005 using different feedstock’s. 
source: (IEA, 2006)  
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The price of the feedstock is multiplied by the quantity needed per produced energy unit and 
an effect associated with the fraction of total food production used by the biofuel industry. 
 
 feedstock price = initial feedstock price * relative food price  
 
 effect of fraction of food = ƒ(fraction of food for fuel) 
 
 fraction of food for fuel = 
production food
fuelfor  food
  
  
 food for fuel = biofuel production * food needed per Mtoe 
 
Feedstock price is assumed to follow the same development as food price. Different climatic 
and geographic regions favor different crops and have different corresponding production 
costs (table 3). This is what the nonlinear effect of fraction of food for fuel (figure 26) 
attempts to capture. The effect is neutral at the foot of the curve. At this point a crude oil price 
of 40 USD makes it profitable to produce for the most efficient producers using feedstock 
from the best sugar cane areas. The first exponential rise represents the cost distribution of 
sugarcane based production. Around 20 per cent of the worlds primary agricultural production 
is sugar cane according to production statistics from FAO8. Costs continue rising as areas 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
favoring maize and sugar beet (about 15 percent of primary production) are taken into 
account. Once it also becomes profitable to use oil seeds and cereals (other than maize) the 
                                                 
8
 Source: FAOSTAT:  online statistical database. http://faostat.fao.org/ (09.06.08) 
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  Figure 26: Table for effect of fraction of food 
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rise in costs nearly flattens out because it is distributed over such a large group of crops. 
Eventually costs rise exponentially again  as feedstock from the least suitable areas is used.  
  
 food needed per Mtoe = 





biofuel  Mtoe 100
production biofuel dAccumulate
 ƒ  
  
The table for learning per 100 Mtoe biofuel produced (figure 27) is a learning curve 
representing improvements of the conversion factor from biomass to fuel, and the adoption of 
specialized crops that yield more usable biomass per hectare. The output of the table is the 
food needed per million tonn oil equivalent biofuel produced. The input, accumulated biofuel 
production, is used as an indicator of the industries accumulated experience.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conventional grain based ethanol production is based on the fermentation of starch utilizing 
only the kernel of the crop. The conversion factor from biomass to fuel can be improved 
significantly by using new technology that enables the utilization of celluloses in stalks, 
leaves, grasses, and tree trunks. This cellulosic ethanol technology, often called ”second 
generation fuels”, opens the door for new crops that still have a large potential yield 
improvement. Switchgrass yields are, for example, lower than corn yields at present, but they 
are expected to double after a period of intensive breeding and crop engineering. The potential 
fuel return per hectare of switchgrass is for this reason assumed to be nearly 60% higher than 
the potential of corn (Childs, 2007).  
 The learning curve only captures the additional yield gained by using specialized crops in 
place of traditional food crops. General food yield improvements are captured by the growing 
production capacity in the food sector and do not have any effect on the food needed per unit 
biofuel produced. Learning saturates as the potential for further improvement shrinks. 
ABP 
100 Mtoe FN 
0 5.30 
5 4.30 
10 3.70 
15 3.30 
20 3.00 
25 2.80 
30 2.67 
35 2.60 
40 2.55 
45 2.50 
50 2.45 
200 2.00 
  Figure 27: Table for learning per 100 Mtoe biofuel produced 
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5.3. Biofuel production capacity 
 
 Accumulated biofuel production  
  = INTEGRAL(biofuel production, Accumulated biofuel production (t0))  
 
 biofuel production = Biofuel capacity 
 
Biofuel production is, as in the oil sector, equal to the production capacity. The following 
formulation of biofuel capacity is, with the exception of desired new biofuel capacity, 
identical to the oil sector: 
  
 
 Biofuel capacity  
  = INTEGRAL(new biofuel capacity - discarded biofuel capacity, biofuel capacity (t0)) 
  
 discarded biofuel capacity = 
capacity biofuel of life average
capacity Biofuel
  
  
 new biofuel capacity =  
on timeconstructi biofuel
oncunstructicapacity  Biofuel
 
  
 





−= )(t
onconstructi
capacity Biofuel
,
capacity
biofuel new
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 effect of biofuel profit on desired capacity =  ƒ(Expected biofuel profit) 
 
 Expected biofuel profit  
  = INTEGRAL(change in perceived biofuel profit, Expected biofuel profit (t0)) 
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Desired new biofuel capacity differs from desired new oil capacity with the addition of  an 
external capital input.  Before an industry has had time to grow and build up own capital, 
there is likely to be little financial capital available on the inside. The external capital input 
gives the biofuel industry a flying start. As the biofuel industry gets larger, further expansion 
is assumed to be financed more by capital from within the industry and less by external 
capital. This effect is modeled using a combination of two table functions:  
 
 external capacity financing = ƒ(Expected biofuel profit) * ƒ(Biofuel capacity)   
 
The first, table for indicated external capacity financing (figure 28), represents the capacity 
external investors wish to finance. The more profitable the industry is expected to be, the 
more interesting it is for external capital. External capital comes inn even when expected 
profitability is below zero. This is due to a distribution of profitability; part of the industry is  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
still profitable when the average is not. Some investors may also be more optimistic than 
others and think the industry will be profitable in the future. The effect of profitability on 
indicated external capacity financing saturates at the approach of limits to financing and 
capital absorption. 
 The second, table for effect of capacity on external financing (figure 29), makes sure the 
input of external capital saturates as the industry grows. The curve is slightly s-shaped 
because there are more potential external investors before the industry has grown large, 
investors that where external in the beginning might gradually become part of the industry 
and as the industry grows the need for external capital also diminishes. 
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   Figure 28: Table for indicated external financing 
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6. Development and testing of an alternative policy 
 
In this chapter an alternative policy is developed and tested using the model. The purpose of 
the chapter is primarily to provide an example of how the model can be used. The alternative 
policy developed involves three components: Removal of current biofuel support, the 
introduction of a fee on biofuel production and a campaign improving energy efficiency and 
conservation. The robustness of the alternative policy is tested using scenarios developed in 
the preceding chapters. Finally, the effect of delaying the alternative policy implementation is 
tested.    
 
6.1. Remove support and introduce a fee on biofuel production  
In the base case scenario biofuel production is supported with a constant sum per produced 
unit from 1975 and throughout the rest of the simulation. This is, of course, not realistic. 
Readers may think a simplification such as this makes the simulated behavior unnecessary 
dramatic. A sector that is financed by public support is also under public control; if the 
biofuel industry should start to get too large or pressure the food market, policy makers can 
pull the brakes by adjusting down the support level.   
 This could probably have been the case if there was no peak in oil production and oil 
price remained low. Figure 30 shows the simulated food price in a policy test where all 
support is withdrawn in 2020. There is hardly any effect because the biofuel industry has 
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already been given time to  grow large and the soaring oil price makes it profitable to produce 
without subsidies. Let us assume far-sighted policymakers understand the potential food crisis 
and decide to withdraw all biofuel support already next year (2009), and in addition to this 
introduce a fee on biofuel production as large as the former support level (170 million USD 
per Mtoe). Even this would not be sufficient. The post peak oil energy shortage causes such 
good biofuel prices that the majority still keep on producing.  
 Stronger measures, like introducing even higher fees, production quotas or a complete 
prohibition of food based biofuel production could be advisable, but in a situation with voters 
complaining about soaring gasoline prices, the political feasibility of such measures could be 
discussed. We will neither pursue these policies or the discussion about their feasibility any 
further here.    
 Let us instead take a closer look at the oil price. The soaring oil price, which itself is a 
problem in terms of energy security, makes biofuel production so profitable that a new 
problem is created (a food security problem). Policies that close the gap between energy 
demand and supply could potentially solve two problems. The gap can be closed both through 
policies that increase supply and policies that reduce demand. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.2. Increase supply? 
We have, in the base case support of biofuel where the shortage in transportable energy was 
met with a policy stimulating growth in production, already seen an example of a supply side 
policy. Other supply side policies could for example be subsidization of fossil fuels based on 
tar sands and coal to liquid, or a support of electric, plug-in hybrids and hydrogen fuel cell 
vehicles that expand the pool of energy available for transport. There is, however, a danger 
 Figure 30: Food price. Effect of removing  
 biofuel support 2009 and introducing a fee  
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that also these supply side policies could yield undesirable side effects. The first two 
examples are clearly in direct conflict with climate policy goals, the second two could be so 
indirectly; by increasing the total demand for electricity and therefore possibly also increase 
the pressure for more coal- and gas-based power. There is much disagreement, debate and 
uncertainty associated with energy supply policies.  
 Physical growth of the economy is constrained by ecological limits making it harder and 
harder to expand without putting additional pressure on ecosystems already under serious 
tension. Yet, it seems as if policymakers and decision makers have a tendency to look for 
solutions involving growth first. If the problem is a traffic jam the solution is to build more 
roads, if there is energy shortage we produce more energy and in the case of unemployment 
the prescription is production of more goods and services. Even the World Commission on 
Environment and Development pointed out growth as the core policy: “The Commission’s 
overall assessment is that the international economy must speed up world growth while 
respecting the environmental constraints” (Brundtland, 1987). This combination of speeding 
up growth and respecting the environmental constraints may be possible in theory, but in 
practice it has proven to be a quite complicated and difficult task. 
 It is, likewise, complicated and difficult to outgrow the problem of energy shortage. A 
general policy advice is to look first for simple, feasible and effective solutions, with little risk 
of undesirable side effects. Following this advice leads us over to the demand side of the 
energy gap.        
  
6.3. Reduce demand 
Reducing demand through conservation and improvements in energy efficiency is, according 
to the Princeton professors Rob Socolow and Stephen Pacala, probably where the largest 
policy potential is (Socolow, 2004). A seemingly unlimited access to cheap energy has 
enabled modern society to establish habits, structures and technical solutions that consume 
energy at a rate far beyond what is needed to support the current standard of living. A wide 
range of technologies ideas and principles are available and ready for large scale 
implementation, many of which could even yield short term economic benefit. One could for 
example support short-term efficiency and conservation measures in current buildings, 
introduce low energy standard claims for new buildings and a two price system for electric 
power disfavoring consumption over a certain minimum level. These measures could free 
large quantities of electric energy and give room for a wide scale promotion of electric and 
plug-in hybrid vehicles that are three to four times as energy efficient as conventional 
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combustion vehicles. Paper recycling and digitalization of information could free forest 
biomass for production of second generation biofuels. Policy makers could also use incentives 
and restrictions to twist the conventional car stock over towards smaller cars with smaller and 
more efficient engines and tires with less rolling resistance. Smart urban planning, mass 
transit and telecommuting could reduce the overall demand for cars and the average distance 
traveled per car. 
Let us assume, in addition to the removal 
of biofuel support and introduction of a 
fee in 2009, that indicated oil demand is 
reduced with 5000 Mtoe by 2050 through 
policies improving energy efficiency and 
conservation (figure 31). The policies 
have a dampening effect on oil price 
making biofuel production less 
profitable, thereby reducing the demand 
for feedstock and relieving some pressure 
from the food market. The result is a 
lower food price.  
 If measures that further reduce the 
gap between energy supply and demand 
are desired to dampen the rise in oil and 
food price even more, the efficiency and 
conservation policy makes it less 
complicated and more likely to identify a 
sustainable and robust mix of supply side 
policies. It must, after all, be easier to 
cover a demand of around 6500 Mtoe 
than a demand of 11500 Mtoe by 2050. 
The damping of oil price could also make 
it easier to gain political support for 
tough restrictions on food based biofuel 
production, both because it implies a 
smaller biofuel industry than otherwise 
  Figure 31: Effect of energy efficiency and  
  conservation policy on food price and oil price  
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and because voters are likely to be less dissatisfied with energy prices and supply. This policy 
combination, removal of support, introduction of a fee and improvement of energy efficiency 
and conservation starting in 2009, is the alternative policy developed in this chapter. The use 
of the expression “alternative policy” will from now on be referring to this policy 
combination.  
 
6.4. Robustness of alternative policy 
Finding a robust policy is more valuable than finding an optimal policy when complexity and 
uncertainty is large. A robust policy yields desirable results over a wide range of scenarios.  
 In figure 32 simulations testing the robustness of the alternative policy, using the 
scenarios developed in the preceding chapters, are compared with business as usual 
simulations using the same scenarios. Business as usual means that there are no policy 
changes; the base case biofuel support policy is kept in all these simulations. The scenarios 
reflect uncertainty about sensitive model parameters.  
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  Figure 32: Robustness of alternative policy  
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Let us take a quick review of the scenarios developed in the preceding chapters: Assumptions 
about the size of oil reserves and the speed of technologic development can have a large effect 
on the development of oil price (chapter 3.2.). The larger oil reserve scenario has a reserve of 
450000 Mtoe instead of 300000 Mtoe in 1950. Figure 5 in chapter 3.2. displays the effect of 
faster or slower technological development on marginal oil costs. The assumption is that a 
faster technologic development allows a smooth transition from conventional sources to 
alternatives at 100 USD per barrel, rather than 200 USD per barrel, whilst a slower 
development would require 300 USD per barrel.  
 The exogenous time series used to represent the development of potential food 
production was in chapter 4.2. altered to create two alternative scenarios (see figure 14 in 
chapter 4.2.): The optimistic yield technology scenario, where the production potential 
continues rising linearly, and the environmental problems scenario where climate change and 
the sum of human activity over time erodes more food production potential than what is 
gained through technologic progress and land expansion. Many of the simulation runs in 
figure 32 also combine two scenarios (for example environmental problems and slower 
technologic development).  
 The alternative policy seems quite robust when it comes to keeping food price down. 
Two of the simulation runs, both involving the environmental problems scenario, give a food 
price notably higher than the rest, suggesting that environmental policies reducing the risk of 
loosing production potential also should be implemented. The two highest prices of the 
alternative policy are still only mid range in comparison with the business as usual policy. 
The highest business as usual food price is twice as high as the alternative policy. 
 The alternative policy also has a stabilizing effect on oil price compared with business as 
usual.  
 
6.5. Effect of delaying alternative policy implementation 
Given the risk that oil production could peak in the near future and cause a soaring oil price, 
time for effective political action seems short. Simulations where the alternative policy start is 
delayed eight, sixteen and twenty four years (figure 33) indicate a disproportionate 
relationship between delay time and policy effect. The alternative policies must be 
implemented before policymakers receive feedback signals in the form of a continuous rising 
food price trend (short-term oscillations could mask the trend). Waiting eight years is enough 
to loose much of the effect.  
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Suppose policymakers wait 24 years and then in 2033, observing a food price nearly 3 times 
as high as in 2008 and a biofuel industry claiming 35 per cent of global food supply, propose 
that this has now become such a large problem that an alternative policy must be implemented 
straight away. Unless measures more extensive and drastic than the alternative policy 
developed in this chapter were to be implemented, the policy would have little effect over the 
time scale of the simulation. The food price, already considered an acute problem in 2033, 
would double once more by 2050.          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Figure 33: Effect of delaying the alternative policy implementation 
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7. Conclusion 
 
The process of model building is cyclical and never ending. Taking it as a given that there in 
the near future is a risk of an oil production peak causing a sharp rise in oil price, simulations 
using the current model version suggest the policy of supporting food based biofuel 
production could be laying the foundation of a future food crisis and that an alternative policy 
needs to be implemented as quickly as possible; most importantly, before policy makers 
receive feedback signals in the form of a continuous rising food price trend.   
Algae based biofuel, second generation biofuels and other new technological solutions 
and discoveries could of course help increase the supply of both energy and food, but the 
principle of precaution makes it more advisable to base planning on technologies, ideas and 
principles already available, tested and proven.    
The alternative policy example developed in this thesis could be one of many alternatives 
and is most certainly not the best, cheapest or most robust policy option available.  
It could, in view of the author, be hazardous to base policy decisions regarding issues, 
with such degree of complexity and uncertainty as long-term food and energy security, 
exclusively on precise econometric models or the random individual mental models of 
decision makers. All models are wrong (including mental models), but some are more 
precisely wrong than others. Robustness, feedback richness and structural consistency is in 
this case of more value than decimal precision. The use of dynamic computer models can help 
systematize and connect qualitative and quantitative information together to a structurally 
consistent whole and, at least potentially, be a useful tool to gain insight about the real world.    
If the model presented in this thesis could be of use to others, some of the following 
research ideas might be worth consideration: 
 
Further research: 
The model had a focus on transportable energy. It could be useful to incorporate all energy 
sources, including non commercial energy, because there are some substitution and 
reorganization options; for example the substitution of electric heating with bioenergy, the use 
of more electricity for transport and increasing the efficiency of non commercial energy use. 
This could also make it possible to avoid using a negative oil reserve stock to represent the 
transition to alternatives.       
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Incorporating an OPEC effect into the oil sector could allow longer oscillations and 
perhaps make the model capable of replicating long cycles in oil price. This could help build 
model confidence and make it possible to introduce policies at different points in the cycle to 
test if this affects model behavior. 
 A more dynamic representation of indicated oil demand would be desirable. The 
indicated demand should ideally involve a stock that makes future demand growth depend on 
history and not a predefined theoretic pathway. Attempts were made at this during the 
modeling process, but a satisfying solution was not found.     
 It could be interesting to model the key producers of food and biofuel more explicitly. 
The international food market is dominated by a few major exporters and the three major 
biofuel producers are amongst these. It could be useful to be able to test scenarios where for 
example a crop failure in key exporting nations is combined with export restrictions and 
growth in biofuel production.  
Food demand is characterized by such extreme disparities that the current aggregation of 
demand makes it difficult to assess food security consequences. A division of demand into 
high middle and low income demand could be one option. It could for this purpose also be 
useful to distinguish between people owning agricultural land (that can produce their own 
food), and others.   
 An alternative to adding detail could be further aggregation to close some loops. The 
exogenous variables could be made endogenous by incorporating the model into a global 
model such as World 3-03 (Meadows, 2004). This would, for example, enable feedback from 
the rising oil price to economic growth and both economic growth and food price could feed 
back to population. A combination of economic depression and record high food and fuel 
prices could affect family planning in poor countries, speed up population growth and cause a 
destructive reinforcing feedback loop.      
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Appendix 
Model constants: 
Parameter Value Units 
   
Oil sector 
expected oil profit adjustment time 0.1 Year 
Initial expected oil price 14.39 USD per barrel 
Initial long term price effects on oil demand 1 Dimensionless 
Initial oil capacity 520 Million tonn oil equivalents per year 
initial oil demand 520 Million tonn oil equivalents per year 
initial oil reserves 3000000 Million tonn oil equivalents 
Initial short term price effects on oil demand 1 Dimensionless 
long term price effects delay 15 Years 
long term price elasticity of oil demand -0.6 Dimensionless 
oil capacity adjustment time 3 Years 
oil capacity lifetime 15 Years 
oil construction adjustment time 0.1 Year 
oil construction time 10 Years 
oil price sensitivity 8 Dimensionless 
oil refinement and distribution 25 USD per barrel 
short term price effects delay 0.75 Year 
short term price elasticity of oil demand -0.08 Dimensionless 
time to adjust expected oil price 1 Year 
traditional oil price adjustment time 15 Years 
   
Food sector 
  
expected food costs adjustment time 1 Year 
expected food price adjustment time 1 Year 
food demand adjustment time 1 Year 
price elasticity of food demand -0.2 Dimensionless 
initial human food demand 1900 Million tonnes per year 
initial food price 130 Index (100=1961) 
Initial food production as fraction of potential 0.6 Dimensionless 
Initial sensitivity to oil price 0.03 Dimensionless 
minimum food production adjustment time 1 Year 
oil price sensitivity adjustment time 15 Years 
sensitivity of food price to food costs 0.2 Dimensionless 
sensitivity of food price to food balance 2 Dimensionless 
   
Biofuel sector 
  
100 Mtoe biofuel reference 100 Million tonn oil equivalents 
average life of biofuel capacity 20 Years 
biofuel capacity adjustment time 3 Years 
biofuel construction time 4 Years 
biofuel supply line adjustment time 1 Year 
conversion to million USD per Mtoe 7.33 Million USD per Mtoe / USD per barrel 
expected biofuel profit adjustment time 1 Year 
Initial accumulated biofuel production 0 Million tonn oil equivalents 
Initial biofuel capacity 0 Million tonn oil equivalents 
initial feedstock price 80 Million USD per Million tonn oil equivalent 
other biofuel production costs 235 Million USD per Million tonn oil equivalent 
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